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ADMIRALTY TORT JURISDICTION-TRADITIONAL MARI-
TIME ACTIVITY EXPLAINED: COMMERCIAL USE OF VESSEL UNNEC-
ESSARY TO INVOKE JURISDICTION. Foremost Insurance Co. v.
Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654 (1982).
Clyde Richardson was killed in a collision between two plea-
sure boats on the Amite River in Louisiana. The decedent's wife
and children brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana against the petitioners, Shirley Eliser
and Foremost Insurance Company, Ms. Eliser's insurer, alleging
negligent operation of the boat which collided with the decedent's
boat. Jurisdiction was claimed under chapter twenty-eight of the
United States Code at section 1333(1).' The petitioners moved to
dismiss the suit on the grounds that it did not state a claim within
the court's admiralty jurisdiction. The district court, citing Execu-
tive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland2 as controlling, found that
since both boats were used exclusively for pleasure and had never
been used in commercial maritime activity, they were not, at the
time of the accident, engaged in "traditional maritime activity," and
the complaint was dismissed. 3
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.4 While agreeing
with the district court that something more than a tort occurring on
navigable waters was needed to sustain admiralty jurisdiction, the
court of appeals found that jurisdiction was present in the instant
case. The court of appeals thought that a jurisdictional test which
depended on a judicial determination of whether a vessel was en-
gaged in a commercial activity would create uncertainty for vessel
owners about whether they were subject to state jurisdiction or fed-
eral jurisdiction. Additionally, the court reasoned that non-com-
mercial navigators traveling on waters that are shared by more than
one state would find themselves subject to different obligations and
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976) provides in pertinent part: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction ... of ... [amny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
2. 409 U.S. 249 (1972). This case held that claims must bear a significant relationship
to traditional maritime activity to be cognizable in admiralty. See infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
3. Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 699 (M.D. La. 1979).
4. Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 641 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1981).
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duties depending on their precise location.5 As a result of these pol-
icy considerations the court held that "two boats, regardless of their
intended use, purpose, size and activity, are engaged in traditional
maritime activity when a collision between them occurs on naviga-
ble waters."6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the confusion in the lower courts in determining federal admiralty
jurisdiction and affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 102 S. Ct. 2654
(1982).
The opinion of the district court7 that the term "traditional
maritime activity" should refer only to commercial maritime activ-
ity can be traced to the origins of maritime. law. The roots of mari-
time law go back over 5000 years to the beginning of commerce in
the Mediterranean Sea.8 Water carriage was the chief means of
transporting people and goods, and there is evidence that some form
of procedure existed to settle any "legal problems" that arose among
those early mariners. 9 While no formal code of sea laws has sur-
vived from these early times,'0 the customs employed in port tribu-
nals throughout history have done much to shape maritime law of
the present. 1'
5. Id. at 316.
6. Id.
7. Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 699, 701 (M.D. La. 1979).
8. 1 E. BENEDICT, THE LAW OF AMERICAN ADMIRALTY, § 2 (7th ed. 1981).
9. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 1-2, at 3 (2d ed. 1975).
10. "Of the functionally or formally 'legal' dispositions that arose... in ancient times
we know very little. Nothing like a formal sea-code has survived even from Greek or Ro-
man antiquity .... " Id.
11. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, uses the example of the distinctive
maritime law system of general average in which if something is sacrificed to save the ship
from peril, contributions from the property not sacrificed are used to make good the loss to
the owner of the sacrificed property. "Glimpses such as this remind us that... maritime
law is very old, and. . . both commercial shipping and its law. . . began in the Mediterra-
nean." Id. at 4.
This early martime law grew out of a need to regulate disputes arising between those
involved in commerce. The decisions of these tribunals were codified into maritime law.
One of the earliest codes of which there is any evidence is the Rhodian Law, referred to in
the Roman digests. Nothing, however, is known of the substantive law of this code. After
the fall of the Roman Empire, political chaos reigned in Europe. Since commerce on the
seas continued throughout this time, the only relatively stable legal system was maritime
law. Port tribunals during the Middle Ages went through the same type of evolutionary
processes as had occurred previously, particularly after the rise of the Italian ports. After
1000 A.D., the right of autonomous admiralty courts to regulate shipping disputes grew out
of the law merchant, the granting of power to local tradesmen to settle their own differences
free from local jurisdiction. Much of the law merchant has shaped the development of pres-
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As commerce increased, the business of port tribunals also in-
creased, accompanied by the need for a written code of laws and
customs of the port.' 2 One of the most important of these written
codes, from the standpoint of American admiralty scholars, was
known as the Rules of Oleron' a and is credited with bringing the sea
customs of the Mediterranean to England. Because these Rules
were probably adapted from Roman and French law,'4 England's
maritime law was from its inception firmly imprinted with civil law
practices, vestiges of which can still be seen today.'5
English maritime law differed in one important respect from its
counterparts in other European countries in that jurisdiction of civil
cases of a maritime nature was given to the court of the Lord High
Admiral. 16 The exact date for this occurrence is not known, but by
the reign of Richard 11 (1377-1400) it was conducting enough busi-
ness to make it the subject of several controlling statutes passed by
Parliament. 7 One of these statutes, which limited jurisdiction to "a
thing done upon the sea,"' 8 was the authority behind the later juris-
dictional conflict between the courts of common law and the admi-
ralty courts.' 9 As the power of admiralty grew, many of the cases
which had been heard in the local common law courts in port towns
were being heard in the admiralty courts. 20 This, along with a dis-
trust on the part of the common law courts for the non-jury trials of
admiralty, led to a practice by the common law judges of issuing
ent maritime law. Id. at § 1-3; 1 E. BENEDICT, supra note 8, § 3; Benedict, The Historical
Position ofthe Rhodian Law, 18 YALE L.J. 223 (1909).
12. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-3.
13. The expression "Rules of Oleron" is actually a generic term designating a number
of similar collections of sea laws known by this name. Traditionally, it has been thought
that Eleanor of Aquitaine wrote the Rules after a trip through the Middle East, where she
supposedly studied the old maritime laws. She then rewrote them on an island off the south-
west coast of France, the Ile d'Oleron. The laws were then taken to England by her son,
Richard I (the Lionhearted) (1189-1199). G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-3,
at 7-8; 1 E. BENEDICT, supra note 8, § 26.
14. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-3.
15. For example, maritime trials in the United States are still, for the most part, tried to
a judge rather than to a jury. In addition, English admiralty practice today is in a court
known as "Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty" (in the vernacular, "Wills, Wives, and
Wrecks"), an odd combination arising from the Civil Law origins of the three subjects. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-4, at 10.
16. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-4. It is from this office that the term
"admiralty" was derived.
17. Id. § 1-4, at 9.
18. Id. (quoting from 13 Rich. 2, ch. 5 (1389)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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writs of prohibition against proceedings in admiralty.2 By the end
of the seventeenth century, admiralty jurisdiction in England had
been so severely restricted that it was much less extensive than that
exercised in other countries. The common law courts, with the aid
of Parliament, had succeeded in limiting the jurisdiction of admi-
ralty to the high seas.22 Excluded from jurisdiction were, among
other things, transactions arising on waters within the body of the
country and any contracts concerning shipping that were not actu-
ally made on the high seas.23
With the voyages of the explorers of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries, shipping patterns changed. European maritime law was
transplanted to the New World ports as the ports grew in impor-
tance to their respective mother countries.24 In the British colonies,
this transplantation took the form of colonial courts of the Vice-
Admiralty.25 Because of the Crown's desire to exercise firm control
over the colonists, the admiralty courts there were not as restricted
as they were in England.26 The Crown recognized the value of a
court of this nature, sitting without a jury, as a means of maintain-
ing power and exempted these courts from the writs of prohibition.27
Because of this experience with broad maritime jurisdiction, the
drafters of the United States Constitution did not adopt the nar-
rower English view of the law.28
The United States Constitution empowers the federal courts to
administer maritime law.29 The Judiciary Act of 1789 implemented
21. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 23-24 (1871). This landmark case
held that recovery of indemnity on marine insurance policies was cognizable in admiralty.
The Court, in attempting to define the scope of American admiralty jurisdiction, discussed
in great detail the limits imposed on English admiralty. The Court concluded that United
States admiralty jurisdiction was not limited by the statutes or judicial prohibitions of Eng-
land. See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-4, at 9-10.
22. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-4. The statutes of 13 Rich. 2, ch. 5
(1389) and 15 Rich. 2, ch. 3 (1391) strictly limited admiralty jurisdiction to occurrences actu-
ally arising on the high seas. A later statute imposed a penalty upon those who sued in the
Admiral's Court contrary to the statutes of Richard II, 2 Hen. 4, ch. 11 (1400).
23. Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 1, 24 (1871).
24. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-4.
25. Id.; Setaro, The Formative Era o/American Admiralty Law, 5 N.Y.L.F. 9 (1959).
26. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-4.
27. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 442 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776). This opinion,
written by Justice Story on circuit, held that the early restrictions on the English courts of
admiralty were not applicable to the colonies and therefore, their restrictions should not be
imposed upon the admiralty courts of the United States.
28. Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441,454-58 (1847) (accepting a broader scope of
admiralty jurisdiction than had been in effect in England).
29. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, provides in pertinent part: "the judicial power [of the
United States] shall extend. . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction."
[Vol. 5:581
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this constitutional grant of power. 30 These grants of power were the
bases of the broad control exercised by the federal government in
maritime matters, not only in the jurisdiction of the courts, but also
in the area of substantive law.3'
Neither the constitutional grant nor its implementing statute
defined the jurisdiction of admiralty. Rather, they presupposed
knowledge of what the terms "admiralty" and "maritime" meant
and left it to judicial interpretation to establish more concrete juris-
dictional limits. 32 Maritime law which was in force at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution was accepted as law, subject to the
power of Congress to alter, qualify, or supplement it as experience
might dictate. 33 Substantive maritime law is, for the most part, con-
trolled by Congress. State legislatures can act on maritime matters
only when the subject does not conffict with general maritime law or
federal statutes.34
One area in which both the state and federal courts exercise
concurrent jurisdiction is that of maritime torts.35 Traditionally, the
determination of whether a tort is maritime and thus within the ju-
risdiction of admiralty depended upon the locality of the wrong.36
This locality test was best defined in The Plymouth37 in which the
Court said:
30. The Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). See supra note 1 for text of statute.
31. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-9, at 20.
32. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21 (1934). Admiralty, rather
than state courts, has the jurisdiction to foreclose a ship mortgage that is within the Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-984 (1976).
33. Detroit Trust Co., 293 U.S. at 43. See also Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375
(1924). (the Jones Act, giving injured seamen the right to trial by jury, upheld as
constitutional).
34. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). State workmen's compensation
laws for longshoremen held unconstitutional since they invaded the federally reserved area
of maritime law. This case is said to have established the "Jensen Line" marking the bound-
ary between landside and admiralty jurisdiction, i.e., the water line.
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The Judiciary Act of 1789 reserved to
suitors in all cases any common law remedies where courts of common law were competent
to give them. Suitors with tort claims may also bring suit, at their option, in an ordinary
civil action in the common law courts (i.e., a state court) or in federal court without refer-
ence to "admiralty" if they meet the other tests for federal jurisdiction. G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, JR., supra note 9, § 1-13 at 37.
36. Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957 (C.C.D. Me. 1813) (No. 13,902), another decision
written by Justice Story on circuit, established the locality test for admiralty tort jurisdiction.
See also The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825) (jurisdiction limited to the
waters within the ebb and flow of the tide).
37. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866). Due to the negligence of the ship's crew, a spark from
the ship ignited the wharf to which it was moored. Jurisdiction was denied since the act took
place on the wharf-on land rather than on water.
19821
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[Tihe wrong and injury complained of must have been commit-
ted wholly upon the high seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the
substance and consummation of the same must have taken place
upon these waters to be within the admiralty jurisdiction ...
The jurisdiction of the admiralty over maritime torts does not
depend upon the wrong having been committed upon board the
vessel, but upon its having been committed on the high seas or
other navigable waters.38
Originally, the application of the locality test was limited only
to waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.39 In 1845, Congress
extended admiralty jurisdiction by statute to include the Great
Lakes, which are non-tidal, and navigable waters connecting the
lakes.40 In 1851, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
this statute and, in the same opinion, held that jurisdiction of admi-
ralty also extended to all navigable waters throughout the nation.4'
With this case the application of the locality test had been expanded
from the waters within the tidal flow to all navigable waters, includ-
ing lakes and rivers. Waters are considered to be navigable when
they are, in their ordinary condition, used or susceptible to use as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade or travel on water.42
The locality test as strictly applied, created, as well as solved,
problems for the courts. As the Court in Executive Jet Aviation v.
City of Cleveland43 said, "[t]he locality test. . . was established and
grew up in an era when it was difficult to conceive of a tortious
occurrence on navigable waters other than in connection with a
waterborne vessel." 44 However, the growth of the aviation industry
and the increased use of navigable waters for recreation have fre-
quently caused problems to occur.45 A strict application of the lo-
cality test at times also caused problems in the area of commercial
38. Id. at 35.
39. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825); see supra note 30.
40. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, ch. 20, 5 Stat. 726, 726-27 (current version, as amended, at 28
U.S.C. § 1873 (1976)) provides: "IT]he district courts of the United States shall have, pos-
sess, and exercise, the same jurisdiction. . . upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting
said lakes as is now possessed and exercised by the said courts. . . upon the high seas, or
tide waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States."
41. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851) (overruling all previ-
ous cases giving jurisdiction a tidal limit).
42. See The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903) (jurisdiction upheld on the Erie
Canal, even though the vessel was a horse-drawn barge engaged in intrastate commerce).
43. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
44. Id. at 254.
45. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of the
586 [Vol. 5:581
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maritime activity. For example, in one United States Supreme
Court case a longshoreman was knocked from a pier into the water.
The case was held not to be within admiralty because the tortious
act took place on the pier, a non-maritime location.46 The converse
of this result occurred a short time later in a case in which a long-
shoreman was knocked from his ship onto the pier. This case was
heard in admiralty since the act occurred over water.47
The passage of the Death on the High Seas Act 48 in 1920 cre-
ated further problems with the locality test. The Act was passed to
remedy the absence of an action for wrongful death in substantive
admiralty law. Jurisdiction was predicated upon the occurrence of
the death at a point more than one maritime league from the
shore.49  When this act was passed, transoceanic flight was un-
known.50 In 1941, however, a court held that this act was applicable
to deaths resulting from an airplane crash at sea." This reasoning
was later used to extend jurisdiction to tortious acts other than
wrongful death.52
Many courts, strictly applying the locality test, allowed jurisdic-
tion solely because a tort occurred on navigable waters. These cases
include injury to a swimmer by a surfboard, 53 injuries to a water-
skier,54 and the crash of an aircraft into Boston Harbor shortly after
takeoff.55 Not all courts blindly followed this rule. The Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals set a precedent by refusing to recognize admi-
ralty jurisdiction in a case brought by a swimmer injured while
diving from a pier.56 Eventually the United States Supreme Court
addressed this issue in a case involving a plane crash into the navi-
problems that occurred. See also, White, The Admiralty Jurisdiction Adrift, 28 Prrr. L. REV.
635 (1967).
46. Smith & Sons v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928).
47. Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co., 295 U.S. 647 (1935).
48. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1976).
49. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
50. Lindbergh's celebrated flight did not occur until seven years later.
51. Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
52. Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa. 1965). Plaintiff
in this case was jolted about and injured as she left the restroom on a transatlantic flight.
The court held that this was within the purview of admiralty, based on Choy. See, supra
note 50, and accompanying text.
53. Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965).
54. King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
55. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1963). The district court
dismissed this case for want of jurisdiction, but the Third Circuit reversed on the ground
that locality alone determines whether a tort is within admiralty jurisdiction.
56. Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1967).
1982]
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gable waters of Lake Erie.57 In Executive Jet the Court held that a
maritime locality alone was not sufficient to invoke admiralty juris-
diction.58 Claims would not be cognizable in admiralty unless a
"significant relationship to traditional maritime activity" 59 was
involved.
Unfortunately, Executive Jet did not completely resolve the ju-
risdictional questions. A common problem that courts confronted
concerned whether non-commercial pleasure boats came under the
jurisdiction of admiralty. At least one court held that traditional
maritime activity referred to commercial activity and denied juris-
diction when non-commercial vessels were involved.6 ° Other courts
found that accidents between pleasure crafts were within admiralty
jurisdiction.6' In order to find jurisdiction present in St. Hilaire
Moye v. Henderson,62 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
heavily on the statutory interpretation of the term "vessel" as found
in the United States Code.63 In addition, the court found that there
could be express statutory provisions which allow jurisdiction to be
applied. The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act provides in
part: "The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to person
or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water. . . ."64 The
need to resolve this confusion led to the grant of certiorari in Fore-
most Insurance Co. v. Richardson.65
In Foremost, the Court addressed only the narrow question of
whether Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland66 sub silentio
overruled the earlier cases which granted admiralty jurisdiction
when two vessels collided in navigable waters, regardless of whether
57. Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
58. Id. at 268.
59. Id.
60. Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1973) (the court, in denying jurisdiction,
relied upon the fact that maritime jurisdiction was born of a need to protect the domestic
shipping industry and to provide a uniform body of rules to govern it).
61. St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974). Accord Oppen v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973) (pleasure boats damaged by an oil spill in the
Santa Barbara channel within admiralty jurisdiction); Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59
(S.D. Cal. 1973) (injury occurring on historical vessel now used as a permanent, dockside
museum cognizable in admiralty).
62. 496 F.2d 973 (8th Cir. 1974).
63. 496 F.2d at 979 (quoting the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1948, 62
Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1970)).
64. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976).
65. 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2656 (1982).
66. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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they were used for commercial or non-commercial purposes. 67 Jus-
tice Marshall, writing for the majority, concluded that Executive Jet
did not overrule the prior cases, stating that there was a sufficiently
substantial interest in the promotion of uniform rules of the sea to
merit inclusion of pleasure boats in traditional maritime activities.68
In addition, there could be potentially disruptive effects on commer-
cial activities if two pleasure boats collided on a busy seaway. The
Court thought that the interest of the federal government in protect-
ing commerce is not strictly limited to the control of commercial
vessels, since that interest could only be fully carried out if all oper-
ators of vessels on navigable waters are subject to federal jurisdic-
tion.69 Also, the Court did not interpret the traditional concern of
admiralty jurisdiction as being limited to commercial vessels, but
rather felt that it had been concerned with the rules of conduct of all
vessels on the shipping lanes.7" This, the Court thought, was suffi-
cient to bring a collision between two pleasure boats within the
meaning of the term "traditional maritime activity."'"
The majority thought that a jurisdictional test tied to the status
of the vessels could lead to problems similar to those that occurred
with the locality test.72 For example, under a commercial rule an
accident occurring between two pleasure boats could still come
under the jurisdiction of admiralty if one of the boats had been used
for commercial fishing.73 The Court declined "to inject the uncer-
tainty inherent in such line drawing into maritime transportation."74
Further, the majority thought that adopting a strictly commercial
test would interfere with the goal of promoting the smooth flow of
maritime traffic, since non-commercial navigators would be subject
to different states' rules depending on their precise location within
the territorial jurisdiction of one state or another.75
The Court also adopted the reasoning of St. Hilaire Moye7 6
stating that, in the laws made to regulate maritime shipping, Con-
gress intended the word "vessel" to apply to all vessels and not just
67. 102 S. Ct. at 2657.
68. Id. at 2660.
69. Id. at 2658.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2659.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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to commercial ones.77 Based on the foregoing principles, the Court
held that a complaint alleging a collision between two vessels on
navigable waters states a claim cognizable in admiralty.78
Four Justices dissented, with Justice Powell writing the opin-
ion.79 The dissent viewed the majority opinion as an erosion of fed-
eralism and censured it as expanding federal jurisdiction at the
expense of state interests.80 No significant interests existed, the dis-
senters thought, that could justify this step.8'
The dissenting Justices used, as authority for the exclusion of
pleasure craft from admiralty, the historical argument that admi-
ralty grew out of a need to protect commercial vessels.82 They
thought that the majority misconstrued the meaning of the term
"traditional maritime activity" as used in Executive Jet. Further-
more, the dissenting Justices seemed to fear that this holding could
resurrect, at least in part, the locality test since under this ruling
admiralty jurisdiction could be invoked any time two vessels col-
lided on navigable waters. 83
Foremost Insurance Company is significant because it clarifies
an uncertain area of admiralty law. In doing so, it accepts the two-
fold test which was presented in Executive Jet, locality coupled with
a nexus to traditional maritime activity. It does not expand federal
jurisdiction, as was argued by Justice Powell in the dissent, since
courts before Executive Jet automatically assumed jurisdiction over
this area. It does, however, reaffirm the holding that admiralty will
not take jurisdiction over torts that occur on navigable waters based
solely on locale. Justice Marshall pointed out that while the holding
in Executive Jet was narrowly framed, it will now be widely con-
strued, within the limitations set down in Foremost.84
One possible reason why a plaintiff might wish to bring a suit in
the federal courts under admiralty law rather than in state courts is
a procedural difference. In personam suits in admiralty are basi-
cally the same as those in other courts with one interesting differ-
ence: if a defendant cannot be found and served with process within
77. 102 S. Ct. at 2659.
78. Id. at 2660.
79. Joining Justice PoweU were Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice
O'Connor.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 2660.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2662.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2658.
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the district, and he has property within the district, the court will
issue a "writ of foreign attachment" for the attachment and garnish-
ment of that property.85 Unlike most other forms of attachment, the
plaintiff in admiralty is not required to post a bond for the property.
A verified complaint and affidavit stating that the defendant cannot
be found anywhere in the district are sufficient.8 6 If, for example,
two boats, one owned by an Arkansan and the other by an
Oklahoman, collide in the Arkansas River at a location within Ar-
kansas, it is possible that the Arkansan could not get personal juris-
diction over the Oklahoman. However, if the Oklahoman's boat
were docked in Arkansas or he had other property in the state, ad-
miralty jurisdiction could be obtained with a writ of foreign attach-
ment by swearing out an affidavit.
State courts are, of course, as fully competent to hear cases in-
volving pleasure boat accidents as they are to hear highway traffic
accidents. Indeed, under the "Saving to the Suitors" clause, 87 most
of these cases will probably still be brought in state courts. But the
need is greater for a tribunal to exercise uniform authority over all
boating accidents in shipping lanes than over traffic accidents on
highways for two reasons. First, territorial boundaries are much less
certain on the waterways than on the highways, and determining the
state jurisdiction in which an accident occurred could be confusing.
Second, there is no constitutional grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts over highways as there is over waterways.
While Foremost answers the question of whether pleasure boats
come under admiralty jurisdiction, there are still unanswered ques-
tions concerning the limits of admiralty jurisdiction. One problem
which might arise would be an accident involving a pleasure boat
and a swimmer. A question also exists concerning the extent to
which Foremost affects the holding in Executive Jet. While it would
seem that Executive Jet, at the very least, precludes admiralty juris-
diction for airplane crashes, contrary results have been reached.88
Each of these cases, in which jurisdiction was found in an aviation
crash, relied on the fortuitousness of the accident in Executive Jet 9
85. FED. R. Civ. P., Supp. Adm. R. "B".
86. Id.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1976). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
88. Higgenbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973) (helicopter
crashing into the Gulf of Mexico under jurisdiction of admiralty since it was the functional
equivalent of a crewboat); Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683 (D. V.I. 1973)
(admiralty jurisdiction extends to accidents arising from flights by seaplanes over interna-
tional waters).
89. The facts of Executive Jet put it outside the test of traditional maritime activity,
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and on the fact that airplanes can engage in traditional maritime
activity.9°
Prior to Foremost, lower courts were often in conflict as to what
constituted traditional maritime activity. A clear test was needed to
resolve these conflicts between those desiring to expand jurisdiction
into developing areas of law, and those desiring to limit jurisdiction
to traditional commercial activity. In defining the test, the Court
has apparently accepted the expansionist view by incorporating it
into the definition of traditional activity. The result is a "locality
plus" test which, once it is applied by the lower courts, could exten-
sively broaden the scope of admiralty jurisdiction.
La Quita Kenner Saunders
since it was entirely fortuitous that the airplane crashed in navigable waters. The plane was
flying an inland route and could just as easily have crashed on land. The Court in that case
left open the possibility that an aircraft flying a route between foreign countries over inter-
national waters could be performing a task previously carried out by waterborne vessels.
409 U.S. at 271.
90. Some additional cases that illustrate aircrafts engaging in traditional maritime ac-
tivity are: Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974) (transoceanic transporta-
tion of cargo by Air Force aircraft performing service traditionally done by ships); Hammill
v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829 (D. D.C. 1975) (commercial aircraft on flight
across Mediterranean Sea served function traditionally carried on by surface vessels); Amer-
ican Home Assurance Co. v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (while finding
no admiralty jurisdiction, the court considered search and rescue operations by helicopter a
traditional function of water borne craft).
